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Abstract
Advanced persistent threats pose a serious issue for modern industrial
environments, due to their targeted and complex attack vectors that are
difficult to detect. This is especially severe in critical infrastructures that
are accelerating the integration of IT technologies. It is then essential to
further develop effective monitoring and response systems that ensure the
continuity of business to face the arising set of cyber-security threats. In
this paper, we study the practical applicability of a novel technique based
on opinion dynamics, that permits to trace the attack throughout all
its stages along the network by correlating different anomalies measured
over time, thereby taking the persistence of threats and the criticality
of resources into consideration. The resulting information is of essential
importance to monitor the overall health of the control system and cor-
respondingly deploy accurate response procedures. Advanced Persistent
Threat Detection Traceability Opinion Dynamics.
1 Introduction
Traditional SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems that
manage the main production cycle of most of the industries have been working
in an isolated fashion during years. In turn, the current scenario shows an
evolution towards a model in which the organization externalizes some services
by interconnecting their resources to Internet networks. The counterpart of this
modernization is the appearance of new cyber-security threats and an increase
of vulnerabilities in the industrial sector, as some reports show [1].
Many of these attack vectors are leveraged in APTs (Advanced Persistent
threats). This is a type of sophisticated attack perpetrated against a particular
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organization, where the perpetrator has significant experience and resources
to penetrate the victim network without being noticed for a prolonged period
of time [2]. Mechanisms such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
antivirus, etc. represent a first solution to the wide range of cyber-security
threats faced by an industrial control system in presence of an APT. However,
there is still a latent need to find advanced mechanisms that are capable of
firstly detecting and then tracing one of this threats from a holistic perspective,
during its entire life-cycle.
In this context, graph theory can be leveraged to apply distributed algo-
rithms. Such algorithms can correlate various anomalies measured over the
network that are potentially consequence of these attacks, while being able to
locate the most affected areas within the topology. More specifically, we take
the proposed scheme in [3] as a basis for our extended solution. This previ-
ous work proposed the use of opinion dynamics as a multi-agent collaborative
algorithm, focusing only on the detection of topological changes over a graph-
defined network. In this article, we show the feasibility of using the core of
this approach to actually include realistic sources of anomaly and successfully
trace the movement of an APT within a defined network architecture, which
helps to deploy tailored response techniques. In order to achieve this, we review
the literature of the most reported cases of APTs with the aim to realistically
represent their stages and the sort of anomalies detected in each step of their
kill chain. Finally, the effectiveness of the solution is theoretically demonstrated
and shown in a test-case. We can summarize our contributions as:
• Modeling of an APT and its attack actions considering the persistence
and criticality of resources.
• Adaptation and implementation of a distributed algorithm to detect real-
istic anomalies affecting the network nodes.
• Creation of indicators to inform about the threat evolution and the net-
work health status.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the
proposed architecture and introduces the concept of opinion dynamics. In Sec-
tion 3 the literature is reviewed to extract information about the APT modus
operandi. Based on this extracted model, an algorithm that can detect and
trace the presence of APT is simulated in Section 4. Then, the approach is
experimentally analyzed using Matlab in Section 5. Finally, the conclusions
drawn are presented in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we lay the theoretical base that permits, on the one hand, the
formal representation of actual APT attacks over a defined network, and the
execution of the detection technique, on the other.
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2.1 Proposed network architecture
As discussed in the Introduction, most industrial ecosystems are nowadays
adopting cutting-edge technologies onto their production chain and monitor-
ing systems. The counterpart of the modernization of industrial technologies
(which we will refer to as ’operational technologies’ or OT) and its integration
of IT (’information technology’) in this context comes with the appearance of
new cyber-security threats. Some of them are inherited from the IT paradigm
and some other arise from the growing integration between IT and OT. We are
talking about attack vectors such as denial of service, presence of malware in
the control teams, exploitation of vulnerabilities in communication protocols,
phishing and social engineering, etc. that will be further described in Section
3.1. For this reason, since there are several reported APTs that attempt to
compromise resources belonging to both the IT and OT parts of the industrial
network, it makes sense that the whole industrial topology can be split into
these different sections: IT and OT, which will be interconnected by firewalls.
The formalization of the proposed network architecture is explained in the
following. Let G(V,E) be a graph that represents the entire network topology,
that contains devices and communication links that transmit information and
control commands between them. This network is composed by the IT and OT
sections, which are respectively represented with subgraphs G(VIT , EIT ) and
G(VOT , EOT ). These sections are joined by a set of firewalls placed in between
(VFW henceforth), so that V = VIT ∪ VOT ∪ VFW . In order to understand how
these network sections are merged, we firstly must introduce a graph theory
concept related structural controllability [4] and power dominance [5]. The aim
is to select the set of those nodes within the network that have the maximum
dominance, which are called the driver nodes (denoted by ND). As introduced
in [5] and extended in [6], let us assume the following two observation rules over
a given network G(V,E):
OR1 A driver node nd in DN observes itself and all its neighbors: this is, the
rest of nodes that share a communication link with nd. This conforms the
Dominating Set (DS) of G, and implies that every node not in DN is
adjacent to at least one member of DN.
OR2 If a driver node nd in DN of degree d ≥ 2 is adjacent to d − 1 observed
driver nodes, then the remaining un-observed vertex becomes observed as
well. This also implies that OR1 ⊆ OR2 given that the subset of nodes
that comply with OR1 becomes part of the set of nodes that complies
with OR2, conforming the Power Dominating Set (PDS). It means
that every edge in E is adjacent to at least one node of DN.
An example of the election of these driver nodes is depicted in Figure 1. More
specifically, the PDS will be used in the OT section of the industrial topology
to represent the set of devices that are connected to the firewalls that also
connect to the IT nodes, thereby merging both sections. The reason for such
election is that in an operational environment multiple kinds of devices coexist.
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Figure 1: Observation rules for the election of the most dominating nodes
However, apart from sensors and actuators, PLCs and HMIs, only SCADA
systems and high-level servers are actually connected to external networks (i.e.,
the IT section or Internet). Therefore, these are the nodes that hierarchically
have more connectivity (so they will be linked to the firewall nodes), which is
equivalent to the controllability concept introduced before. As for the IT section,
since most of the devices range from ERP to customer-end systems (and whose
computational capabilities are not as restricted as OT devices), we assume all
nodes are connected to the firewalls and thereby can access the operational area.
However, concerning the network topology of the IT and OT section, we must
note that each of these subnetworks is built with a different network distribution.
On the one hand, G(VOT , EOT ) follows a specific network construction centered
on power-law distributions of type y ∝ x−α, which is extensively used to model
the topological hierarchy of a electric power grid and their monitoring systems
[7]. These networks commonly contain substations, which are nodes with high
degree (i.e., the number of edges incident on the node) connected to nodes
with lower degree, like sensors and actuators. In turn, the IT section (given by
G(VIT , EIT )) is modeled according to a small-world network distribution, that
represents the conventional topology of TCP/IP networks [8].
Once we have established the architecture for the network, we are in position
to not only simulate attacks over the topology, but also deploying the detection
system based on opinion dynamics, which is the main contribution of our work.
2.2 Opinion dynamics
In this section, we present the fundamentals behind the distributed detection
technique from a theoretical point of view. In order to better understand what
this solution measures and how it provides a valuable insight for further mon-
itoring and response procedures, we must attend to how an APT behaves. As
introduced in the first section, one of these threats comprises several stages over
which the attacker manages to compromise certain devices over the victim net-
work until he/she reaches an interest point. It is then when the intruder usually
chooses to either disrupt the productive process or exfiltrate information to the
attacker headquarters, as described further in Section 3.1.
This chain of individual attack actions commonly takes quite a long time to
perpetrate the network resources; over this evolution, it would be of paramount
interest to extract two main pieces of information:
4
1. The portion of the network that is subject of attack at any time, being
possible to distinguish what set of devices are experiencing the same degree
of anomaly, which can be produced by an attack. This is essential for
applying effective response techniques and potentially isolate the attack,
while the rest of the areas can keep functioning as in normal conditions,
hence ensuring the continuity of the production by this way.
2. The traceability of events occurred to the network, with respect to the
evolution of the intrusion throughout the network since the very first mo-
ment it broke into it. In this sense, when it comes to APTs, we must
also take the persistence of attacks into special consideration at all times,
since an advanced threat can go unnoticed during months and suddenly
perform a new attack. In terms of the detection technique, this implies
that it is also necessary to keep track of old subtle anomalies noticed in
the network, to serve as feedback to the technique and correlate their rel-
evance with current detected anomalies, that altogether may be part of
a more ambitious threat. As it is technically described in Section 4, this
weight given to anomalies experienced on the network in the past devalues
over time depending on the criticality of the victim devices and the type
of anomaly detected.
These objectives are accomplished by the means of a distributed cooperative
algorithm called based on Opinion Dynamics [9], since it models the actual
opinion formation among the individuals of a society: each of these individuals
(denoted as agents in the following) does not simply share or disregard the
opinion of the rest of agents, but he/she takes them into account to a certain
extent in order to form his own opinion. From this moment on, what the
opinion dynamics process does is to take an average over the opinions that can
be repeated over and over again. This eventually leads to formed consensus of
opinions belonging to different agents closer to each other. Correspondingly, it
is equivalent to obtaining a fragmentation of the different opinions within the
society, which can be applied to intrusion detection by representing the opinion
according to the level of anomaly that each agent (representing a device of the
network) experiences.
In the following, we formalize the intrinsics of this multi-agent algorithm,
which constitutes a light modification of the approach proposed in [9] and an
extension of the work presented in [3]. Let A be the set of agents of the system
such that A = {a1, a2, ..., an}. Here, xi(t) represents the individual opinion of
each ai at time t (ranging from zero to one), where t refers to the iteration of
the algorithm. On the other hand, the weight given to the opinion of any other
agent j is denoted by wij , where
∑n
k=1 wik = 1 (therefore, agent i also takes its
own opinion into account). Finally, the formation of the opinion for agent i in
the next iteration t+ 1 is described as follows:
xi(t+ 1) = wi1x1(t) + wi2x2(t) + ...+ winxn(t)
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Consequently, every agent adjusts its opinion in period t + 1 by taking a
weighted average of the opinions of the rest of agents. When t tends to infinity,
consensus of opinions are formed (so finally there are just a few opinions shared
by clusters of agents), which can also be represented visually. Conversely, what
we want to accomplish in our particular scenario is to use these opinions as a
way to represent a detected anomaly by a given agent that is installed within
the network, so that similar values (provoked by the same threats) converge the
most critically affected areas from a high-level perspective (and the severity of
such attacks) can be ultimately located.
One aspect that needs to be clarified is the assignment of weight among
agents: for simplicity, for a given agent, we assume that the weight value assign
to its neighbors is uniformly divided into those agents whose opinion is very close
to its one (we establish a epsilon value of 0.2 of deviation between both values).
This models the fact that agents close to each other with the same degree of
anomaly are likely to be detecting the same threat in their surroundings.
In order to successfully apply this concept of a multi-agent algorithm to
the context of anomaly detection in an industrial setting, there are various
questions that need to be further addressed: i) who can play the role of agents
within the industrial network, considering that there should be as many logical
agents as nodes within the network (|V | in our case); ii) how each anomaly
can be represented as an opinion held by an agent, and how to retrieve such
anomaly values; and iii) how the attacks affect the persistence and the anomaly
detection, depending on their severity and the criticality of the victim nodes,
which influences the persistence and the application of the opinion dynamics.
These questions will be reviewed and answered in Section 3 through the analysis
of real-word APTs and existing defense mechanisms and architectures.
3 Attack and defense models
3.1 Review of existing APTs, APT stages, and defenses
For the specification of the opinion dynamics algorithm, we need to provide an
accurate representation of APT attacks in the context of our network model.
Therefore, here we will first review the most important APT threats and groups
that have specifically targeted industrial control systems. For the interested
reader, a more detailed review of these APTs – including exploited vulnerabili-
ties, software modules, etc – is available at [10].
Stuxnet (2009). Stuxnet was one of the APTs that popularized this concept
and brought it to the limelight. Developed by a state agent, the main goal
of this worm was to hinder the enrichment of uranium in the Iranian nuclear
facility of Natanz [11]. It is believed that its primary infection vector, which
was used to infiltrate the facility, was USB flash drives. Once the malware was
installed in the ‘patient zero’ computer, it also used other mechanisms (network
shares, infected project files) to spread through the internal network, searching
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for the computers that directly controlled the uranium enriching centrifuges.
Finally, the malware modified the code that controlled the centrifuges in order
to silently destroy them.
DragonFly group (2013-2014, 2015-). Active since 2010, this particular
APT actor has always focused on cyberespionage. On 2013, it started several
campaigns against energy suppliers [12]. In its first wave of attacks, the main
goal was to discover and map the existence of OPC (Open Platform Communi-
cations) SCADA servers located in the attacked network. For this purpose, after
the initial infection, the malware queried the network in search of OPC servers
using specific OPC DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) calls. On
the other hand, its second wave of attacks followed a more conservative ap-
proach: it retrieved information mostly by extracting documents and screen-
shots from the infected computers.
BlackEnergy (2015-2016). The BlackEnergy malware, created by an APT
actor known as Sandworm, was used to attack the energy infrastructure of
Ukraine in December 2015 [13]. After the initial infection, the first goal of the
malware was to replicate to as much computers as possible through Windows
Admin Shares (e.g. through PsExec and remote file execution). The second goal
of the malware was to set up various connections to external command&control
networks. Using these networks, malicious operators were able to activate var-
ious components (KillDisk, circuit breaker manipulator) that caused havoc in
electricity distribution companies.
ExPetr (2017). ExPetr was a wiper disguised as ransomware, which tar-
geted local administrations and various industrial companies in Russia and
Ukraine [14]. It used two primary infection vectors: a modified version of the
EternalBlue exploit used by WannaCry, and an trojanized version of the MEDoc
tax accounting software. Once ‘patient zero’ was infected, this malware used
both the EternalBlue exploit and the BlackEnergy propagation mechanisms to
propagate over the local network. Inmediately afterwards, the fake ransomware
component of the malware would be activated.
Another element that is essential for the formalization of the behaviour of
APTs in our network model is the definition of the different attack stages (i.e.
intrusion kill chains) that are performed by APTs. These attack stages – whose
order can be changed depending on the specific APT – have been extensively
studied and described by various academic and industrial researchers [15, 16, 17],
and can be summarized in the following steps:
• Reconnaissance . Adversaries gather information about the targeted
industrial network, and create an attacking plan.
• Delivery . After choosing a set of vulnerable computers (‘patient zero’) at
the targeted industrial network, adversaries deliver the malware to those
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computers, either directly (e.g. through email or vulnerable services) or
indirectly (e.g. contaminating websites with malware).
• Compromise . At this stage, the malware is executed in the target ma-
chine, and takes control of it. This stage involves several steps, such as
privilege escalation, maintaining persistence, and executing defense eva-
sion techniques.
• Command and Control . Once the malware controls ‘patient zero’, it
opens a communication channel with the remote attacker, which will be
used to send commands, extract information, etc.
• Lateral Movement . The concept of lateral movement encompasses the
different steps that the malware takes in order to control other comput-
ers located in the targeted network. Lateral movement includes internal
reconnaissance, compromise of additional systems, and collection of sen-
sitive information.
• Execution . The malware finally performs the attack against the targeted
industrial network. Attacks range from exfiltration (extraction of sensitive
data) to destruction of resources.
Finally, in order to define our defense model, and to provide an answer to the
questions raised in the previous section, it is necessary to provide a brief overview
on the actual state of the art of the existing defense mechanisms against the
attack stages defined above. This information is extracted from more detailed
reviews that are already available in the literature, such as [18]. Here, we will
only highlight the most important aspects that will influence over the defense
model of our network and the different detection probabilities:
• Detection coverage. As of 2018, there are multiple intrusion detection and
prevention mechanisms, both commercial and academic, that are able to
analyze the state of all elements and communication systems in industrial
networks, including the field devices.
• Central correlator systems. There are several commercial platforms, such
as [19], whose goal is to provide support for event correlation. These
platforms can retrieve events and alerts from various domains (e.g. IT,
OT networks) and from various sources (e.g. SIEM systems, vulnerability
scanners) in a distributed way.
• Beyond attack signatures. There exist several solutions that are able to
indicate the potential existence of anomalous situations, even if the attack
signatures are unknown. Examples include not only diverse statistics (e.g.
traffic volume, network connections, protocols used), but also machine
learning mechanisms, specification-based systems, and industrial honey-
pots.
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• Network features. in comparison to the IT infrastructure, OT networks
exhibit a more consistent behaviour. This feature is actually used by
certain detection mechanisms to more accurately pinpoint the existence
of anomalies.
3.2 Representation of APT attacks and detection proba-
bilities
After reviewing the behaviour of industrial APTs and the state of the intrusion
detection mechanisms, we can define a realistic attack and defense model for
our network architecture, thereby addressing the questions raised in Section 2.2.
Our attack model is simple: we assume that, given a certain goal (exfiltration
and/or destruction), adversaries are able to successfully perform an APT attack
against the network architecture defined in Section 2.1 using any set of the attack
stages defined in Section 3.1. As for the defense model, and given the actual
state of the art in the area, we assume that all the elements of the network are
covered by anomaly detection mechanisms, whose outputs can be retrieved by
correlation systems similar to the ones described in [18].
By assuming the existence of a correlation system, it is possible to centralize
the computation of the opinion dynamics algorithm in a more computationally
powerful node (that gathers all the opinions and perform the correlation). As
a consequence, the agents described in Section 2.2 can now be instantiated as
logical agents, whose inputs will be retrieved from the different outputs of the
anomaly detection mechanisms. From those inputs, every agent can now de-
rive a certain opinion xi(t), or detection probability (i.e. the probability that
an attack is taking place) for a given interval of time. These opinions are in
turn influenced by the amount of alerts and their criticality. For example, a
combination of anomalous statistics will slightly raise the opinion of an agent,
and the existence of a confirmed attack (e.g. through the detection of an at-
tack signature) will maximize that opinion. Compared to traditional detection
mechanisms, the effectiveness of this approach resides in the ability to correlate
anomalies throughout the network and hence trace the location of attacks, also
considering their severity and persistence.
Taking into account the attacker model, we can now provide a formal rep-
resentation of the intrusion kill chain of APT attacks. Let attackStages be a
set of potential attack stages that an APT can perform against the industrial
control network G(V,E) as defined in Section 2.1, such that attackStages =
{attack stage1, attack stage2, ..., attack stagen}. This set comprises the follow-
ing elements:
• initialIntrusion(IT,OT,FW ). The initial access that affects a node n0
(known as ‘patient zero’) of the IT network, OT network, and firewall,
respectively.
• compromise . The adversary takes control of a certain node ni, obtaining
higher privileges, maintaining persistence, and executing defense evasion
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techniques. Moreover, this stage also includes the internal reconnaissance
of the direct neighbourhood of ni, neighbours(ni).
• targetedLateralMovement(IT,OT,FW ). From a certain node ni, the ad-
versary chooses a FW, IT, or OT node nj from the set neighbours(ni),
and executes a lateral movement towards that node. Note that, in this
model, the concept of lateral movement only encompasses the delivery of
malware towards the target node.
• controlLateralMovement . From a certain node ni, the adversary chooses
the node nj from the set neighbours(ni) with the highest betweeness (i.e.
the node with significant influence over the network), and executes a lat-
eral movement towards that node.
• randomLateralMovement . From a certain node ni, the adversary chooses
a random node nj from the set neighbours(ni), and executes a lateral
movement towards that node.
• spreadLateralMovement . From a certain node ni, the adversary exe-
cutes a lateral movement towards all nodes from the set neighbours(ni).
• exfiltration . From a certain node ni, the adversary establishes a connec-
tion to an external command&control network, and extracts information
using that connection.
• destruction . The adversary either destroys the node ni, or manipulates
the physical equipment (e.g. uranium enriching centrifuges) controlled by
node ni.
• idle . In this phase, no operation is performed.
Once the set attackStages is defined, it is possible to represent APT attacks
that target our particular network model G(V,E). In particular, for every APT
APT , there can be an ordered set attackSetAPT , comprised by one or more
elements of the attackStages set, that represent the APT chain of attack actions.
As an example, the attack set of Stuxnet can be represented as follows:
attackSetStuxnet = {initialIntrusionIT , compromise, exfiltration,
targetedLatMoveFW , compromise, targetedLatMoveOT ,
..., targetedLatMoveOT , idle, ..., destruction}
These particular instances are defined taking into consideration the overall
goal of every APT. For example, in the case of the Stuxnet malware, its goal
is to find a particular node nOT ′ ∈ VOT that manages an uranium enriching
centrifuge. Therefore, after infecting patient zero nIT 0 ∈ VIT , it seeks the
location of a firewall node nFW ∈ VFW that connects the G(VIT , EIT ) and
G(VOT , EOT ) regions. Afterwards, it moves inside the G(VOT , EOT ) region until
10
it finds node nOT ′ . Finally, after waiting for some time, the malware executes
its payload, manipulating the centrifuge.
Regarding how the different attack stages influence over the application of
the opinion dynamics and the calculation of the detection probabilities, we need
to consider that certain attack stages will generate more security alerts. This,
in turn, will increase the probability of detecting that particular attack stage.
Therefore, we need to consider the existence of different classes of detection
probabilities. Here, we define Θ as an ordered set of detection probabilities of
size d, where Θ = {θ1, ..., θd} and θi = [0, 1], such that ∀θi, θi > θi+1.
initialIntrusion(n0) θ3
compromise(ni → neighbours(ni)) θ2 → θ5
∗LateralMovementIT,FW (ni → nj) θ5 → θ4
∗LateralMovementOT (ni → nj) θ5 → θ3
spreadLateralMovement(ni → neighbours(ni)) θ5 → θ4
exfiltration(ni) θ4
destruction(ni) θ1
Table 1: Map of attackStages to Θ
Once Θ is defined, we can create a model that maps every element of the
set attackStages to the elements of Θ. Such model, where d = 5 and Θ =
{θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5}, is described in Table 1. We explain the rationale behind this
mapping in Appendix B.
4 Detection of APTs
After formally representing the attack stages, plus their relation to the detection
probabilities, we can now use the proposed detection probabilities as inputs to
the opinion dynamics algorithm, and hence simulate its response in an industrial
architecture when it faces a particular instance of APT.
Algorithm 1 describes the life cycle of an APT composed by a set of attack
actions against a given network. Each of these attacks generates an anomaly
that is detected by the corresponding agents (and possibly by their neighbors),
increasing their opinion in a value defined by the previously introduced Θ. After
this, as commented in earlier sections, we also introduce a attenuation value on
the opinion that represents the effect of old attacks in order to reduce their
influence when computing the current opinion. This ”decay” value, applied
in the UpdateOpinionsWithDecay function, depends on the attack stages
suffered in the past by the agent and the criticality of its monitored device: the
more devastating the alert generated is (during the detection phase), the longer
its effect will take to disappear. Consequently, we define Φ as an ordered set of
decay values, where Φ = {φ1, ..., φd} and φi = [0, 1], such that ∀φi, φi < φi+1.
Therefore, for all i ∈ d, φi is inversely proportional to the θi value, and both
are applied to the detected anomaly value after each stage. This procedure,
explained in Algorithm 2, is a way to account for the persistence when computing
the opinion dynamics. It is important to note that both the respective anomaly
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and decay addition or reduction implies a normalization of the opinion value,
from 0 to 1.
Algorithm 1 APT life cycle - anomaly calculation
output: δ representing the delta value
local: Graph G(V,E) representing the network, where V = VIT ∪ VOT ∪ VFW
input: attackSet← attackStageAPTx , representing the APT chain of attack actions
x← zeros(|V |) (initial opinion vector)
{performedAttacks← }
{attack ← firstattackfromattackSet}
while attackSet 6=  do
if attack == initialIntrusion(IT,OT, FW ) then
attackedNode← random v ∈ V(IT,OT,FW )
x(attackedNode)← x(attackedNode) + θ3
else if attack == compromise then
x(attackedNode)← x(attackedNode) + θ2
for neighbour in neighbours(attackedNode) do
x(attackedNode)← x(attackedNode) + θ5
end for
else if type(attack) == LateralMovement then
previousAttackedNode← attackedNode
attackedNode← SelectNextNode(G, attackedNode)
x(previousAttackedNode)← x(previousAttackedNode) + θ5
x(attackedNode)← x(attackedNode) + θ3,4
else if attack == exfiltration then
x(attackedNode)← x(attackedNode) + θ4
else if attack == destruction then
x(attackedNode)← x(attackedNode) + θ1
else if attack == idle then
No attack performed
end if
x← UpdateOpinionsWithDecay(x, performedAttacks)
performedAttacks← performedAttacks ∪ attack
mergedOpinions← ComputeOpinionDynamics(x)
δ ← ComputeDelta(mergedOpinions)
attackSet← attackSet \ attack
end while
Once the x vector of opinions is updated with the new attack action (with θ)
and attenuated due to old stages (through Φ), the opinion dynamics algorithm is
executed to identify the affected areas of nodes and the level of severity of these
attacks. However, although this gives insight of the location of threats (as it is
visualized in the experimentation section), it would be also necessary to obtain
an overall value of the network health from the opinion dynamics processing.
Therefore, we have created the so-called delta indicator, which represents a
global anomaly value and is computed in the ComputeDelta function. This
value is calculated with the weighted average of opinions by the amount of
agents that hold the same detected abnormality, as described in Algorithm 3.
However, since this aggregated value is dependent on the number of agents to
calculate the average, in practice we can compute it over different sections of
the network (i.e., IT or OT), thereby increasing its granularity. Using these
values, we can quickly know the overall anomaly degree of every portion of the
network.
Note that all these algorithms and the approach itself are validated from a
theoretical point of view in Appendix A.
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Algorithm 2 Decay of anomaly values over time depending on the attack action
function UpdateOpinionsWithDecay(x,performedAttacks)
for attack in performedAttacks do
affectedNode← getAffectedNode(attack)
if attack == initialIntrusionIT,OT,FW then
x(affectedNode)← x(affectedNode)− φ3
else if attack == compromise then
x(affectedNode)← x(affectedNode)− φ2
for neighbour in neighbours(affectedNode) do
x(affectedNode)← x(affectedNode)− φ5
end for
else if type(attack) == LateralMovement then
origin← getOriginOfMovement(attack)
x(origin)← x(origin)− φ5
x(affectedNode)← x(affectedNode)− φ3,4
else if attack == exfiltration then
x(affectedNode)← x(affectedNode)− φ4
else if attack == destruction then
x(affectedNode)← x(affectedNode)− φ1
end if
end for
return x
end function
Algorithm 3 Computation of delta value
function ComputeDelta(mergedOpinions)
opinionClusters← uniqueValues(mergedOpinions)
frequencyV ector ← zeros(|opinionClusters|)
for i:=1 to size(opinionClusters) step 1 do
frequencyV ector(i)← CountOccurrencesOfOpinion(opinionClusters(i),mergedOpinions)
end for
δ ← 0
for j:=1 to size(opinionClusters) step 1 do
δ ← δ + frequencyV ector(j) ∗ uniqueV alues(j)
end for
δ ← δ/size(mergedOpinions)
return δ
end function
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i 1 2 3 4 5
θi 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1
φi 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.1
Table 2: Detection probability and decay values used in the Stuxnet test case
5 Experimental simulations and discussion
In the following, we present a test case for illustrating how we can apply the
opinion dynamics-based technique while representing an APT against a given
IT/OT industrial topology, as described in the paper. For this test case, we
have implemented the network topology and algorithms 1, 2 and 3 in Matlab.
Let us assume that we have a topology composed by three OT nodes and
three IT nodes connected by a firewall, as explained in Section 2.1. According
to Section 3.2, Stuxnet comprises a set of nine different attack actions that will
be perpetrated against the proposed network, where each node counts on an
individual agent to monitor its anomalies. If we execute the opinion dynamics
algorithm after each stage, we can analyze the different clusters of anomalies
detected by sets of agents. Following the model presented in Section 3.2, we have
assigned values for each θ and φ according to the ordered set of probabilities in
Table 2, considering a realistic scenario. We have also introduced a deviation
of 0.1 to values in θ to simulate a low level of noise or probability of detecting
the corresponding anomaly after each attack stage. Figure 2 visually represents
the resulting values in each agent after the four most representative stages,
where (1) the attacker compromises the IT node and exfiltrates information,
(2) compromises the firewall and then (3) moves to the last OT of the network
and remains idle, right before the destruction of this node is performed (4).
Four different idle operations are performed in this point, with a total of twelve
attack actions. Numbers by the name of nodes represent the value of anomaly
(opinions) that each agents holds.
As we can also see in Figure 2, the attacker traverses the whole network
according to the Stuxnet behavior (where the current attacked node appears
rounded), while the agents and its neighbors are able to detect the anomalies
that consequently take place (the more red the node is, the greater the detected
anomaly is). At the same time, we see how attenuation of anomalies also occurs,
especially visible when the attacker leaves a node. In this example, the first IT
node compromised is the number 1 while the final one is the OT number 3; the
former is gradually attenuating its value as the attack evolves, according to the
behavior explained in Section 4.
This ability to identify where the threat is active within the network is
enabled by opinion dynamics. If we have a look at its value in form of a plot in
some point, we obtain the graph in Figure 3. This corresponds to the execution
of the algorithm (with 20 inner iterations) after the second stage depicted in
Figure 2, where the FW is compromised after attacking the first IT nodes. As
we can rapidly see in the resulting graph, there are two agents (the aFW and
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(a) Exfiltration (b) FW compromise (c) OT compromise (d) Destruction
Figure 2: Network topology used in the test case
Figure 3: Opinion dynamics after the second stage
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Figure 4: Evolution of the opinions over time to trace the APT stages
the aIT node) that successfully detect the same level of critical abnormality
in their area; this is also detected by some of their neighbors mildly, which is
represented with the central consensus. Apart from these, the rest of nodes only
detect a negligible value of anomaly.
By this means, we can statically identify where the threat is located and
which severity it experiences. However, as commented in Section 2.2, it would
be also necessary to trace all the events of the APT and highlight the most
affected nodes it has traversed. In this sense, if we represent the succession of
opinions agreed by agents over time for the Stuxnet attack described previously,
we easily have such information, which is represented with Figure 4.
As we can see there, the opinion profile for all agents evolves over the set
of APT attack actions, showing a more pronounced value in the IT section in
earlier stages and the OT in latter phases of the Stuxnet APT, as the attack aims
to ultimately compromise a PLC by firstly intruding the network through a IT
node. A similar effect is seen when we study the change in the delta value, which
can be calculated either in the whole network or on any of its subnetworks (i.e.,
IT or OT). Figure 5 shows the progression of this indicator in each case, which
also shows us how IT delta decreases over time and its value in OT increases
according to the chain of attacks. In general, the value acquires the highest
value when the last OT node is compromised, since the network has suffered
most of the attacks in the previous stages. Beyond that point, delta decreases
(due to the idle operations) and then it finally increases with the destruction of
the node.
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6 Conclusions
APTs nowadays represent a dramatic source of economic losses and reputation
damage for the industry, which obligates researchers, managers and operators to
make a great effort to analyze them to trace their behavior and anticipate their
effect. It then becomes mandatory to explore new ways of detecting and trac-
ing anomalies beyond traditional detection techniques. In this paper, we have
described the feasible application of an already available theoretical approach
based on a distributed collaborative algorithm (opinion dynamics). We review
the literature to gather the set of attack vectors that these threats leverage with
the aim of representing the anomalies and show the effectiveness of the algo-
rithm in a realistic setting, which also considers the influence of persistence over
time. As a result, we have valuable information about the status of the network
at all times. This design constitutes the middle step towards a future imple-
mentation in a real testbed that is currently being under development, which
also takes into account additional sources of detection and accurate indicators.
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A Correctness proof: consensus-based detection
and traceability
This section presents the correctness proof of the consensus-based detection
and traceability problem for APTs. This problem is solved when the following
conditions are met:
1. The attacker is able to find an IT/OT device in the system and attack it.
2. The detection system is able to trace the threat, thanks in part to the
consensus (detection and traceability).
3. The system is able to properly finish in a finite time (termination).
4. The algorithm is capable of terminating and providing advanced detection
at any moment (validity).
The first requirement is satisfied because we assume that the attacker is
capable (i) declaring the chain of attacks in advance, such as scanning, lateral
movement, exfiltration or destruction (see Section 3.2), and (ii) identifying kinds
of devices (e.g. IT/OT nodes and firewalls) by their functionalities. The modus
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operandi of the attacker is systematic except when the attacker needs to make a
specific lateral movement, either through the selection of a new random neigh-
bor node within the network or the selection of the neighbor with the highest
betweeness. To comply with the predefined attack patterns, the attacker first
needs to identify the first target node, which generally belongs to IT network
− evidently, this characteristic depends on the type of attacker (insider or out-
sider) and their skills. If the attacker is an outsider, her goal is to find a vITi
∈ VIT in order to penetrate by itself within the system, and to advance until
reaching those nodes serving as firewalls such that vFWi ∈ VFW . Once a vFWi
is finally reached, the attacker tries to gain access in the operative network to
compromise the most critical devices, i.e. vOTi ∈ VOT . If the attacker is an out-
sider, the compromises relies, in this case, on the pre-established APT threat
chain; i.e. on attackSet.
The second requirement is also found due to the software prevention agents,
ai ∈ A, integrated as part of vITi , vFWi and vOTi of G(V,E). These agents
present capacities to detect anomalies and trace the intrusive presence by means
of opinion dynamic parameters, the values of the which are attenuated according
to time and aggressiveness of the threat (the decay factor). This attenuation,
dependent on Φi, does not means to completely forget an incident in past.
But rather, in remembering the most significant aftermaths of the previous
attacks in order to show the advance of the threat in real time, and therefore
its traceability.
Through induction we demonstrate the third requirement, corresponding
to termination of the approach. To do this, we specify the initial and final
conditions together with the base case. Namely:
Precondition: by assumptions, we assume that the attacker is an advanced
expert with skills to reach the IT-OT communication channels belonging
to G(V,E). However, this capacity depends on the set attackSet defined
in Algorithm 1, which defines threat chain such that attackSet 6= .
Postcondition: (i) the attacker reaches the networkG(V,E) and compromises
at least a node in V such that attackSet =  after the loop in Algorithm
1. And (ii) the system successful detects the threat such that δ > 0 and
marks the traceability according to the real consensus state of G(V,E),
registered in the array vector x.
Case 1: attackSet 6= , but | attackSet | = 1. In this case, the attacker
needs to launch the unique attack defined in attackSet. As mentioned, if
the attack does not imply a lateral movement, the success of the threat is
concentrated on just one node in V , since the following iteration of the loop
implies that attackSet← attackSet\attack, and therefore attackSet = .
To the contrary, if the attack entails a lateral movement, then the attacker
has to select a new neighbor node, either from a random or target point
of view.
Any attack in V means an impact on the attacked node with a significant
influence in its opinion dynamic (i.e. x(attackednode). If, in addition, the
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decay factor is activated, the system weakens, but does not delete, the
aggressiveness of the threat to stress the current trace of threat over the
time. This computation is possible through Φi in Algorithm 2. Once x is
updated, the system computes the δ value taking into account the weighted
average of the opinion dynamics of the entire system (see Algorithm 3).
Induction: if we assume that we are in step k (k ≥ 1) of the loop where
attackSet 6= , then Case 1 is going to be considered each time. When
k = | attackSet |, the system computes Case 1 and ends the detection
algorithm with δ > 0 since attackSet = , showing the traceability of the
threat through x and complying with the postcondition.
Finally, the latter requirement is also satisfied since the algorithm finalizes
and detects the threat through opinion dynamic (either individual or collective)
and shows the traceability of the threat over the time.
B The mapping of the attackStages to Θ
We have presented in Section 3.2 a model that maps every element of the set
attackStages to the elements of Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5}. For this mapping, we
have taken into consideration the defense mechanisms analyzed in Section 3.1.
In particular, the rationale behind this mapping is as follows:
• We assign θ1 only to the destruction stage, because any major disruption
in the functionality of a device (e.g. unavailable resources, device turned
off) will trigger multiple high priority alerts. Note that, as explained in
our defense model, we assume that all field devices are also covered by
detection mechanisms, thus any attack (e.g. the Stuxnet final payload)
against these sensitive devices can be easily detected.
• θ2 is only assigned to the element at the left side of the compromise stage
(ni → neighbours(ni)). The reason is simple: the act of compromising
and taking control of ni will not only trigger various host alerts, but also
multiple network alerts due to the various discovery queries targeting all
neighbours(ni). The correlation of all these events will draw attention to
the state of ni.
• For θ4, we consider the security alerts caused by combination of a sin-
gle anomalous connection to a node plus the delivery of malware to that
node. As such, this θ covers all the elements at the right side of the
lateralMovement stages. Note, however, that in some particular cases
(like the initialIntrusion stage and the ∗LateralMovementOT stages),
additional anomalies will be detected: a potentially anomalous external
connection, and a certain instability in the otherwise stable OT communi-
cation environment, respectively. Therefore, the θ assigned to the elements
of those stages will be θ3.
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• Finally, θ5 is assigned to those stages where the nodes produce or receive
anomalous traffic (e.g. a connection that deviates from what is considered
as normal traffic). Again, in situations where a connection with the outside
world is made (e.g. exfiltration stage), as the possibility of anomalous
traffic will increase, the θ will be increase as well.
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